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Abstract: This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly is one of the best, if 
not the best, books ever written on the history of financial crises. It presents a 
comprehensive survey of financial crises utilizing an extraordinary database of 
macroeconomic and financial series. The massive data analysis constituting the core of 
the manuscript leads the authors to arrive at a simple but powerful conclusion: while 
times change, locations change, actors change, financial crises often exhibit more 
similarities than differences throughout history. This conclusion nicely relates to the title 
of the book as it proves wrong the claim “this time is different” that is often heard during 
boom times preceding crises. The book is a must read for anyone interested in economics 
and finance. This review presents a brief summary of the book and a discussion about its 
implications for future research.  
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This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly is one of the best, if not the 
best, books ever written on the history of financial crises. This view is also shared by 
many others as evidenced by the superlatives in earlier reviews: awesome, superb, 
masterpiece, terrific… The book by Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff 
(hereafter RR) is a must read for anyone interested in economics and finance.  
 
The book presents a comprehensive survey of financial crises utilizing an extraordinary 
database of macroeconomic and financial series. The massive data analysis constituting 
the core of the manuscript leads RR to arrive at a simple but powerful conclusion: while 
times change, locations change, actors change, financial crises often exhibit more 
similarities than differences throughout history. This conclusion nicely relates to the title 
of the book as it proves wrong the claim “this time is different” that is often heard during 
boom times preceding crises.  
 
It is rarely the case that a primarily academic book with lots of statistics earns many 
accolades from a wide readership base and quickly becomes a best-seller. What are the 
unique features making this book such a major success story? First, the timing of the 
publication cannot be better as the main messages of the book read like a condensed 
summary of everything that went wrong before the global financial crisis of 2007–09. 
Second, it is basically a meticulous analysis of a dataset of financial crises, but it 
masterfully blends economics, finance, history, politics, and human psychology. 
Moreover, while similar books of economic history often present detailed narratives of 
events surrounding crises episodes, this one searches for facts, enriches these facts with 
sufficient historical background, and finally presents them in a digestible format.  
 
RR provide an excellent example of how to structure a book as they present their separate 
but interrelated analyses of different types of crises in a seamless fashion. The rest of this 
review broadly parallels with their structure. Section II presents a brief summary of the 2 
 
 
book. Section III provides a short discussion about the implications of the book for future 
research. The last section concludes with a brief list of broader lessons of the book for 
our profession. 
 
II. What Did We Learn? 
 
Financial Crises: Definitions and Database 
 
Part I of the book has three chapters focusing on the definitions of various crises 
analyzed, the syndrome of debt intolerance, and their database, respectively. The book 
focuses on a wide range of crises: sovereign debt crises (associated with domestic and 
external default), banking crises, inflation crises, and exchange rate crises. RR use 
qualitative and judgmental analysis to identify the dates of the debt and banking crises. 
As they acknowledge, this approach to crises dating has some obvious drawbacks: it 
could date crises too late (or too early) and gives no information about the end date of 
these episodes. They identify inflation and currency crises by assigning threshold values 
for the relevant variables. It would be useful to consider the sensitivity of their findings to 
changes in these thresholds. This would also improve the precision of statistical 
significance of many point estimates they report.  
 
The first two chapters also provide detailed definitions of many key concepts frequently 
used in the book, including serial default, the this-time-is-different-syndrome, and debt 
intolerance. Their empirical analysis of debt intolerance and serial default suggests that, 
while safe debt thresholds hinge on country-specific factors, such as a country’s record of 
default and inflation, when the external debt level of an emerging economy is above 30–
35 percent of GNP, the likelihood of an external debt crisis rises substantially. More 
importantly, when an emerging market country becomes a serial defaulter of its external 
debt, this increases its debt intolerance and, in turn, makes it very difficult for the country 




Their database, which is introduced in Chapter 3, contains a vast array of variables, 
including price indices, exchange rates, real GDP, exports and imports, government 
finances, national accounts, public debt, house prices, stock market indices, commodity 
prices, and global interest rates. It has 66 countries and covers more than 800 years.
1 One 
aspect of their database deserves special attention: they put together the first 
comprehensive series of public debt. This is a critical milestone for the literature on 
public debt since the previous databases only cover the major advanced countries and a 
handful of emerging markets over the past 30 years.  
 
Many Faces of Crises 
 
Parts II, III, and IV present a detailed account of sovereign external debt crises, domestic 
debt crises, banking crises, and crises associated with high inflation and currency 
volatility. RR document that sovereign debt crises have been around throughout history. 
While emerging markets have often been associated with default during the latter part of 
the 20
th century, today’s advanced economies have had their own share of default 
episodes in the past. The periods of a high number of defaults often coincide with a sharp 
rise in the proportion of countries going through banking crises. There also appear to be 
close associations between the global default cycle and cycles in commodity prices and 
foreign capital.  
 
RR then present a fascinating panoramic view of domestic debt crises, which have 
received only limited attention in academia and policy circles. Domestic debt tends to 
account for a large share of the total debt stock and appears to be the key factor behind 
two puzzling observations. First, many emerging market countries default on their 
external debt at seemingly low levels of debt thresholds. Second, some countries prefer 
inflation rates much higher than the seignorage-maximizing rate. RR uncover that one of 
                                                 
1 Almost one-fourth of the book is allocated to data appendices providing detailed tables about 
the sources and definitions of variables and crises.  4 
 
 
the distinguishing features of such countries in both cases is that they have a sizeable 
stock of public debt. Their analysis provides not only new stylized facts, but also 
indicates new directions for theoretical work on domestic debt. For example, although 
default on domestic debt tends to be less frequent than that on external debt, it still takes 
place quite often suggesting that the usual assumption about the trivial role of domestic 
debt in earlier theoretical models needs to be revisited. 
 
They document that the incidence of banking crises is highly similar in the advanced and 
emerging market countries. It takes a shorter time to resolve a banking crisis than a debt 
crisis as the adverse impact of the latter is much larger on trade and investment. Banking 
crises are often associated with substantial declines in tax revenues and significant 
increases in government spending. These results suggest that the indirect fiscal costs of 




Their tour de force presentation of inflation and currency crises shows that these episodes 
also take place at a surprisingly high frequency throughout history. Inflation crises are 
often followed by episodes of currency crashes probably because of the abuse of 
governments’ monopoly on currency issuance. Although they examine the real effects of 
debt and banking crises, they skip a discussion of the real consequences of crises 
associated with high inflation and currency crashes.  
 
Insights about the Recent Global Financial Crisis 
 
One of the main attractions of the book is of course its relevance to the recent global 
financial crisis, which is covered in Part V. The ideas constituting the first two chapters 
of this part were extremely influential during the height of the crisis (see Reinhart and 
                                                 
2 RR extend the work presented in this part of the book and provide a deeper statistical analysis of 
the linkages between debt and banking crises in Reinhart and Rogoff (2011).  5 
 
 
Rogoff, 2008 and 2009). In late 2008, they were the first ones to document the 
remarkable parallels between the evolution of the U.S. subprime crisis and that of 
previous banking crises. For example, a deterioration of current account deficits and a 
sharp increase in housing and equity prices took place ahead of earlier banking crises, 
which are similar to the dynamics prior to the latest U.S. episode. Moreover, these types 
of episodes are often accompanied with significant fiscal costs as the value of 
government debt tends to rise sharply. RR also examine the global implications of the 
latest episode in light of the lessons from previous crises. 
 
III. What is Next? 
 
RR acknowledge that their book “can only scratch the surface of … data set” and 
conclude with a list of future areas of research in Part VI. Given that the book is a 
treasure chest of ideas and data, the typical reader will of course come away with a 
number of additional questions. Below is a list of their main suggestions and other 
potential research topics the book raises.  
 
Better understanding of debt dynamics and house prices 
  
RR make a passionate case for additional efforts to collect cross-country data on 
domestic debt and house prices. The first response to this call provides a rich database 
covering gross government debt-to-GDP ratios for 174 countries over a long period of 
time (see Abbas et al., 2010). The BIS has an initiative underway to collect cross-country 
house price series and recently made them publicly available on its web page. It is 
necessary to expand these efforts to get a richer understanding of domestic debt dynamics 







Early Warning Models (EWM) 
 
RR emphasize the importance of research on EWM in order to improve the prediction of 
the onset of crises. This issue has also been extensively discussed in policy forums and 
received substantial attention from international organizations (see IMF, 2010). A 
number of recent papers also analyze the ability of various EWM in predicting the latest 
crisis (see Rose and Spiegel, 2010; Frankel and Saravelos, 2010). These studies report 
that there is a lot of scope to improve these models as there is still an intensive debate 




RR’s main conclusion has also led to an active research program providing a nuanced 
perspective about the differences and similarities between the latest episode and earlier 
ones. Although the latest crisis featured some close similarities to the earlier ones as RR 
document, it also featured some significant differences, such as the explosion of complex 
financial instruments in highly integrated global financial markets (see Claessens, Kose, 
and Terrones, 2010). In contrast to previous crises, balance-sheet opaqueness and reliance 
on wholesale funding also increased systemic fragility during the latest episode (Gorton 
and Metrick, 2009; Cecchetti, Kohler, and Upper, 2009). In addition, the latest crisis is 
different from the earlier episodes in terms of the scale and scope of policy interventions 
(Laeven and Valencia, 2010).  
 
Dating of crisis 
 
An important lesson from the book is of course our need for a deeper understanding of 
crises and the policy issues surrounding these episodes. Taking their cues from the book, 
recent studies provide new insights into the dating of crises and pitfalls of different 
approaches. After a detailed analysis of events surrounding financial market difficulties 
over the past 60 years, Lopez-Salido and Nelson (2010) arrive at a substantially different 7 
 
 
chronology of U.S. financial crises than RR do. RR identify only one crisis episode 
(1984–91) before the latest crisis whereas Lopez-Salido and Nelson (2010) document 
three distinct crises: 1973–75; 1982–84; and 1988–91. Based on their new dating, they 
argue RR’s claim that recoveries are systematically slower in the aftermath of financial 
crises does not hold for the postwar United States.
3 These differing findings across 
studies point to the need for continued work on developing robust dating methodologies 
that are less subjective.  
 
Financial cycles and stress 
 
It would be useful to go beyond the outright financial crises and consider periods of 
financial disruptions, which are not necessarily crises, yet do create financial stress with 
possible adverse macroeconomic outcomes. Recent research provides various 
complimentary approaches to identify such episodes (Claessens, Kose, and Terrones, 
2011a, 2011b). In parallel with the business cycle literature, these approaches use a well-
established and reproducible methodology for dating cycles in financial markets, 
including the episodes of disruptions. Moreover, with these approaches, it is possible to 
consider disruptions in different financial markets (credit, housing, equity, and currency 
markets) whereas a financial crisis dummy often lumps them together. Recent attempts 
also examine periods of financial turbulence employing an index of financial stress in 




RR conjecture that the latest global financial crisis will have a significant effect on the 
research program analyzing the linkages between the real economy and financial markets, 
i.e., macro-financial linkages. The book presents a rich description of the evolution of 
                                                 
3 A number of recent papers put together new data series of financial crises (see Laeven and 
Valencia, 2008; Cecchetti, Kohler, and Upper, 2009; Schularick and Taylor, 2009). 8 
 
 
these linkages during crises, but it naturally falls short of providing an analysis of 
structural causes of these episodes. There is already a massive research program 
underway investigating the macro-financial linkages in order to get a better 
understanding of the fundamental sources of financial turmoil. These studies focus on 
market imperfections that give rise to the well-known financial accelerator mechanism, 
but also consider the operations of financial intermediaries and markets, i.e., the supply 




As RR observe, national financial crises often generate global repercussions. The latest 
episode is a case in point as its global reach and depth are without precedent in the post–
World War II period. This emphasizes the importance of having a better grasp of 
transmission mechanisms through which such episodes spill over to other countries. In 
addition to the standard trade and financial linkages, recent research also considers the 
roles played by new financial channels, such as commercial paper conduits and global 
banks, and new trade channels, such as vertical trade networks, in the transmission of the 
latest episode (see Acharya and Schnabl, 2010; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011; and 
Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar, 2010).  
 
IV. What Broader Lessons? 
 
The latest crisis has led to an intensive discussion among macroeconomists about the 
research priorities of our profession. RR’s book provides important insights into these 
discussions as it presents a brilliant illustration of how to produce relevant, timely, and 
influential research. First, it is important to have a deeper understanding of the data. This 
requires going beyond the short history and thinking about the alternative sources in 
order to gather the richest possible data series. The historical episodes can be an excellent 
input into empirical and quantitative analyses, if one can bring enough observations to the 
table to test certain hypotheses.  9 
 
 
Second, given the unprecedented impact of the book, it is useful to acknowledge the 
immense value of rich empirical work. There are significant benefits associated from the 
study of historical episodes using empirical approaches as the book clearly shows. In this 
context, it is important to go beyond the standard moment matching exercises and think 
about how the dynamics of such episodes compare with the broader patterns of cycles. 
This type of empirical work should be married with rigorous theoretical and quantitative 
models in order to arrive at informed policy decisions. However, it is also high time to 
evaluate the benefits of esoteric theoretical attempts before having a good sense of the 
empirical evidence (see Caballero, 2010). 
 
Finally, humility goes a long way in our profession like it does in many others. Before 
congratulating each other for the ability of our sophisticated models in matching certain 
moments and for our policies achieving durable growth, well-functioning financial 
markets, and inflation stability, it is useful to be cautious and remember the title of this 
book: whenever we say “this time is different” because we know better, we eventually 
realize that there is much more we need to learn.  
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